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COMMENTS
PROSECUTION FOR INTERRACIAL COHABITATION AS A
DENIAL OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT*
Appellants, a Negro man and a white woman, were arrested
and charged with having violated a Florida statute which prohibits an interracial couple from occupying the same room at
night.' On appeal from a conviction by the trial court the appellants contended that they were denied the equal protection of
the fourteenth amendment in that, first, the statute under which
they were convicted applied only to cohabitation between interracial couples, and second, another Florida statute which prohibits interracial marriages 2 precluded them from asserting the
defense of common law marriage. The conviction was affirmed
by the Florida Supreme Court. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed. Because the section applies only
to a white person and a Negro who commit the specific acts and
because no couple other than one made up of a white and a Negro
is subject to conviction, § 798.05 is invalid as a denial of the equal
protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. McLaughlin v. Florida,85 Sup. Ct. 283 (1964).
The Florida Supreme Court and the appellees relied solely on
Pace v. AlabamaB as the controlling authority for upholding the
conviction. In that case the Supreme Court let stand a conviction
under an Alabama statute which forbade adultery or fornication
between a white person and a Negro, and which imposed a greater
punishment than was imposed under another statute which pro4
hibited the same conduct between couples of the same race.
* McLaughlin v. Florida, (U.S. 1964).
1. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 44, § 798.05 (1941): Any negro man and white
woman, or any white man and negro woman, who are not married to each
other, who shall habitually live in and occupy in the nighttime the same room
shall each be punished by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or by
fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 44, § 741.11 (1941).
3. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
4. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 16 (1958): If any man or woman live together in
adultery or fornication, each of them shall on the first conviction of the offense,
be fined not less than one hundred dollars, and may also be imprisoned in the
county jail, or sentenced to hard labor for the county, for not more than six
months; on the second conviction for the offense, with the same person, the
offender shall be fined not less than three hundred dollars, and may be
imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to hard labor for the county, for
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In the instant case the Court distinguished the Pace decision.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority and quoting from
Pace, stated that equal protection implies that any person "whatever his race . . . shall not be subjected, for the same offense,

to any greater or different punishment."' In his view Pace held
that Alabama had designated as a separate offense the commission by a white person and a Negro of the identical acts forbidden by the general provisions, and was thus not in violation
of the equal protection clause.
Conversely, the Florida law makes an act criminal when committed by a white and a Negro, but not criminal when committed
by two persons of the same race. Other Florida statutes set up
punishment for living in open adultery, lewd and lascivious behavior, fornication, and adultery by a white and a Negro.0 The
first two of these require proof of intercourse to sustain a conviction, and like the third forbidding fornication, are of general
application. The fourth section, prohibiting adultery and fornication between a Negro and a white person, reaches the same
type of conduct proscribed in the first three sections, and is
similar to the statutes at issue in the Pace case. The statute in
issue in this case, however, is limited to interracial couples, and
its elements are different from those of the previous sections
in that it is necessary to prove only cohabitation. Proof of intercourse is not required. Thus it makes criminal acts which are
legal when committed by couples of the same race.
The distinction drawn by the Court is, therefore, that the
Alabama statutes set out one punishment for all the individuals
in a class who were reached by the statute, and another punishment for those individuals in another class who were reached by
a different statute. Because the Alabama laws applied equally
to those within a single class of offenders, the different treatment accorded interracial and intraracial couples was held to
be irrelevant. On the other hand, the Florida statute applied only
to certain classes of people for a particular act, and, unlike the
Alabama statute, did not apply equally and was therefore void.
not more than twelve months; and, on a third, or any subsequent conviction,
with the same person, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for two years.
ALA. CODE tit 14, § 360 (1958) : If any white person and any negro, or the
descendant of any negro intermarry, or live in adulterey or fornication with

each other, each of them shall, on conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary
for not less than two nor more than seven years.

5. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883).

6. FL.

STAT.

AxN. tit. 44, §§ 798.01-.04 (1941).
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It is difficult to find any real consistency in the Court's distinguishing of Pace v. Alabama in view of the recent trend
toward a liberalization of the interpretation of the equal protection clause. Just twelve years after Pace the Court held that
no different degree or higher punishment shall be imposed than
is imposed on all for a like offense.7 More recently, Shelley V.
Kraemer held that equal protection of the laws is not achieved
through indiscriminate imposition of equalities. 8 Pace v. Alabama is directly opposed to all present interpretations of the
fourteenth amendment, and, if the Court were to remain consistent in its decisions, should have been overruled. The present
case represents the Court's attempt to recognize stare decisis
while at the same time reaching the desired new end.
A majority of the Court implied that the statute could have
been upheld if the state had shown a valid legislative purpose,
but a statute whose purpose was to prevent breaches of the basic
concepts of sexual decency was not such an overriding legislative
purpose as to permit punishment of promiscuity by one racial
group and not another. In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice
Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart disagreed with the implication
that a valid legislative purpose is a basis for discriminatory
legislation.
There is a presumption that state legislatures acted within a
valid legislative purpose, and that legislative power has not
been transcended unless there is no substantial relation to a
proper purpose. 9 The cases of Korematsu v. United States and
Hirabayashiv. United States indicate, however, that this presumption does not exist where racial discrimination is a factor.' 0
It is a settled rule that racial classification must be for the
accomplishment of a purpose or the promotion of a policy which
is within the permissive function of the state, and which bears
a relation to the object of the legislation that is substantial,
rather than speculative or remote."'
There have been cases where racially discriminatory legislation has been upheld, but these seem to be the exception rather
than the rule. 12 The great majority of the cases seem to support
7. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 679 (1895).
8. 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
9. Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912).
10. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
11. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928).
12. Cases cited note 10 supra; United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261

U.S. 204 (1923).
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the view of the concurring Justices.13 And even though there
is support for their position, the majority in the present case
make it clear that discriminatory legislation bears a heavy
burden of justification and the courts will subject such statutes
to the most rigid scrutiny. The position taken by the majority
and the concurring Justices is therefore very similar, in that
the legislative purpose required by the majority would likely be
present only under extraordinary circumstances such as those
present in the Korematsu and Hirabayashicases. 14 Indeed, the
majority opinion expresses this view in quoting from Skinner 'v.
Oklahoma ex reZ. Williamson:
When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same offense and sterilizes one, and
not the other, it has made as invidious a determination as
if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.' 5
In terms of effect the invalidating of the statute did not
change the law of Florida to any great extent. The other four
sections of Chapter 798 accomplish the same result of making
promiscuous and immoral conduct subject to criminal prosecution, but now sexual intercourse must be proved when the couple
is interracial as well as intraracial.
South Carolina has no statute similar to the one declared
invalid in this case. The statute prohibiting adultery and fornication is of general application and treats all parties alike. 16
More important is the strong dictum dealing with the miscegenation laws; South Carolina is one of nineteen states' 7 having such
a statute.' 8
13. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) ; Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917);
Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).

14. At issue in both of these cases was the permissibility of the federal government to place restrictions upon persons of Japanese descent during World
War II. The action was justified on the ground that during war a government
may have access to extreme measures that would not be permitted absent an
emergency situation.

15. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-406 (1962).
17. Applebalm, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 GEo. L. J. 49 (1964).
18. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-7 (1962).
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Although the case was reversed in their favor, the appellants
must have been disappointed in the failure of the Court to rule
on the constitutionality of the miscegenation statutes. The issue
was raised by the trial judge's instruction to the jury that the
defendants were not entitled to the defense of common law marriage because Florida law prohibits marriage between Negroes
and whites. 10 The Court stated that since § 798.05 was invalid,
it was unnecessary to rule on the validity of the miscegenation
statute. The state had based its argument for the validity of the
cohabitation law on the validity of the miscegenation statute,
in the light of certain legislative history surrounding the passage of the fourteenth amendment. 20 The Court rejected this
argument without ruling on the miscegenation law. Based on
Oyama v. California2 1 the Court held that the statute itself had
to meet the requirements of the fourteenth amendment, and it
had failed to do so.
Even though the Court sidestepped a direct ruling on the issue
the constitutionality of the miscegenation laws is on shaky
ground. The Court's attitude is made quite clear in the majority
opinion:

There is involved here an exercise of the state police
power which trenches upon the constitutionally protected
freedom from invidious official discrimination based on race.
Such a law, even though enacted pursuant to a valid state
interest, bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and will

be upheld only if necessary and not merely rationally
related to the accomplishment of a permissive state policy.22
It is apparent from even a casual reading of this passage that
the Court would not uphold the statutes solely on the basis of
a proper legislative purpose.
The Court should, however, give at least cursory recognition
to two other arguments favoring constitutionality. The first of
these is the legislative history surrounding the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the fourteenth amendment, which
seems to indicate that the framers had no intention for the act
19. Statute cited note 2 supra.
20, Brief for Appellee, pp. 10-37, McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 Sup. Ct. 283

(1964).
21. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
22. McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 Sup. Ct. 283, 290 (1964).
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23
It is
or the amendment to apply to state miscegenation laws.
a settled rule that the Court is to place itself as nearly as possi24
ble in the condition of the men who framed the instrument.
put into the Constitution except through the
Nothing new can be 25
process.
amendatory
The Supreme Court has not hesitated, in recent years, to disregard legislative history. In areas once considered to be under
state control the court has found violations of equal protection
and due process. In Mapp v. Ohio the Court held the due process clause prohibited evidence obtained in an unlawful search
and seizure from being used in a state court 26 and in Brown v.
Board of Education public school segregation was held unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause.2 7 These
two examples are merely indicative of the Court's tendency to
give the amendment a broader interpretation than the framers
intended. The fourteenth amendment has become the "strongarm clause" of the Constitution.
The other consideration which the Supreme Court should at
least recognize is the prior declarations of the judiciary. The
Court has itself had, before the present case, two opportunities
to rule on the constitutionality of miscegenation statutes. In
Naim v. Naim, an annulment action, a marriage was declared
invalid under the Virginia miscegenation statute and the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the statute did not
violate the fourteenth amendment. On appeal the United States
Supreme Court remanded the case to the state court to determine
the true relationship of the parties. The Virginia court, affirming its prior decision, held that the parties were residents of
Virginia, married in North Carolina for the purpose of circumventing the statute, and so related to the state at the time of the
marriage as to give Virginia the jurisdiction in question. Upon
application to the United States Supreme Court to recall the
remand the Court held that the second judgment of the Virginia
court left the case devoid of a properly presented federal
28
question.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 504-1861,
24. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).

23.

2459-3149 (1866).

25. UlIman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956).
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), reinstated, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985

(1956).
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In Jackson v. State the constitutionality of the Alabama
miscegenation statute was directly in issue. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate either the
States Supreme
federal or state constitutions, and the United
29
Court denied petitioner's writ of certiorari.
In view of the sweeping decisions of the last two decades, it
is difficult to understand why the Court has avoided, on three
separate occasions, taking the ultimate step as far as racially
discriminatory legislation is concerned, and declaring the statutes unconstitutional. The discretionary power of the Court to
hear certain cases has been one means of avoiding a ruling, and
this denial in no way indicates the Court's opinion of the matter.30 In the present case the Court avoided the issue by reversing on another ground.
There have been numerous cases in the lower federal courts
and in the various state courts dealing with the constitutionality
of these statutes,3 1 although South Carolina has never ruled on
the issue. With one exception their validity has been upheld.32
As late as 1944 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declared
that the Oklahoma statute forbidding marriage of any person
of African descent to any person not of such descent is not
violative of the fourteenth amendment.33 The weight of judicial
authority thus favors their constitutionality. Most commentators, on the other hand, take the opposite view and think that
the statutes have no valid constitutional grounds. 34
29. 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So.2d 114 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
30. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
31. See, e.g., In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262 (No. 6550) (C.C.N.D. Ga.
1871) ; Ex parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602 (No. 7825) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879);
State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (1890) ; State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882
(1942); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895) ; Scott v. Georgia,
39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. Rep. 42 (1871);
Carter v. Veith, 139 La. 534, 71 So. 792 (1916), discussed in Annot., 76
A.L.R. 771 (1932); Ferrall v. Ferrall, 153 N.C. 174, 69 S.E. 60 (1910);
Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 797, 231 Pac. 483 (1924), discussed in Arnot., 3
A.L.R.2d 240 (1949).
32. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), discussed in 12
U. DET. L. J. 91 (1949), 2 U. FI. L. REV. 283 (1949), 3 Wyo. L. J. 159
(1949).
33. Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944).
34. See Comment, InterracialMarriage: A Survey of Statutes and Their
Interpretation, 1 MFRCER L. Rav. 83 (1949); Note, The Constitutionality of
Miscegenation Statutes, 1 How. L. J. 88 (1955); Shakes, The Serbian Bog
of Miscegenation, 21 RocKY MT. L. Rav. 425 (1949); Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitutionality of Miscegnation Statutes, 42 CORNELL L. Q.
208 (1957). But see Comment, Statutory Prohibitions Against Interracial
Marriages, 32 CALIF. L. Rav. 269 (1944); Walton, The Present Status of
Miscegnation Statutes, 4 Wm. & M.ARY I REV. 28 (1963).
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It would be unrealistic, however, to conclude that the present
situation will remain static in view of the Court's growing tendency to extend the applicability of the equal protection clause
to matters formerly considered under state control. The Court
has moved forward, without exception, striking down legislative history, public policy, and legislative purpose arguments
whenever racial issues have been involved 5 The Court in the
instant case indicates a willingness to follow this tendency.
The Supreme Court will be squarely faced with the issue again
in the near future. On January 27, 1965 a three judge federal
court in Richmond heard oral arguments in the case of Loving
v. Commonwealth30 involving an interracial couple who married
in Washington, D. C. and moved to Virginia, where they were
arrested and charged with violation of the state miscegenation
law. Regardless of the outcome, the case will undoubtedly be
appealed to the Supreme Court. Under the dictum of the present case, if they decide to accept the challenge and rule on the
issue, the Court will likely declare the statute unconstitutional.
HowAPM P. KING

35. Walton, The Present Status of Miscegenation Statutes, 4 Wx. &

MARY

L. REv. 28 (1963).

36. Civil No. 4138, United States District Court, E.D. Va., Oct. 28, 1964.
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SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF A DIRECT CONTEMPTDENIAL OF DUE PROCESS?*
The grand jury for the criminal court of Cook County, Illinois, issued a subpoena duces tecum to the defendant Mandel
Skar, president of Sahara Inn North, Inc., to produce certain
records. The defendant appeared before the grand jury but did
not produce the records called for by the subpoena. A petition
was filed by the grand jury asking that a rule be entered directing the defendant to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. The defendant did not answer the petition.
When the State introduced no evidence to support the petition,
the defendant moved to dismiss and discharge the rule. The
trial court denied the motion. The defendant then testified in
an attempt to explain his failure to produce the records. At the
conclusion of his testimony the court found the defendant quilty
of contempt and sentenced him to six months in jail. On appeal,
held, reversed. Due process requires something more than mere
allegations in a petition to support a conviction and extrinsic
evidence is necessary where the contempt was not committed in
the ocular view of the judge. People v. Skar, 198 N.E.2d 101
(Ill. 1961).
The power to punish certain contempts of court quickly and
effectively by a summary proceeding is familiar to the courts.
Such a power given without safeguards may be abused with the
result that the right of the individual litigant to have his day in
court is relegated to second place for the sake of order and
efficiency. The Illinois decision in the Skar case is an attempt
to correct such abuses.
A broad definition of contempt of court covers acts or conduct
amounting to disrespect of, or indignity to, a judge or court;
interference with or disobedience of the processes, orders or
judgments of the court; some obstruction of the due and proper
administration of justice in a pending case; or some misconduct
of an officer of the court.' Contempts of court are classified as
direct or indirect depending upon whether the act was committed
within or without the presence of the court 2 A direct contempt
* People v. Skar, (Ill. 1964).
1. Melton v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 642, 170 S.W. 37, 39 (1914).
2. E.g., O'Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942); Snow v.
Hawkes, 183 N.C. 365, 111 S.E. 621 (1922); Ex parte Ratliff, 117 Tex. 325,
3 S.W.2d 406 (1928).
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has been defined as one committed in the actual presence of the
court or so near thereto as to interfere with the proper administration of justice.3 An indirect contempt is an act committed at
a distance from the court which tends to degrade the court or
obstruct, interrupt, prevent, or embarrass the processes of
justice.4 An Illinois court in attempting to clear up the problem
of what constitutes a direct or an indirect contempt stated:
It is sometimes stated that direct contempt is that committed
in the presence of the court while in session, whereas indirect contempt is that committed out of the presence of the
court. [Citing cases.] The test seems to be whether or not
the court knows, without hearing evidence, that contemptuous conduct actually occurred.5 (Emphasis added.)
The importance in determining whether a contempt is direct
or indirect lies in the proceedings for punishment. If not stipulated by constitutional or statutory provision, the general rule is
that courts have the power to punish direct contempts by summary proceeding. 6 This is permitted on the theory that the
judge has observed all the essential elements of misconduct and
immediate punishment is necessary to prevent demoralization of
7
the court's authority before the public.
A summary proceeding is defined as "any proceeding by
which a controversy is settled, case disposed of, or trial conducted, in a prompt and simple manner, without the aid of a
jury, without presentment or indictment, or in other respects out
of the regular course of the common law. '8 A summary proceeding is considered in contravention of due process, but it is
deemed necessary to protect the judicial system. Summary
orders can be used to stop disturbances in the courtroom, to
discourage further disturbances in the case before the court, and
3. In re Lee, 170 Md. 43, 183 At. 560 (1936).
4. E.g., Ex parte Stricker, 109 Fed. 145 (6th Cir. 1901) ; Ex parte Earman,
85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 760 (1923) ; Snow v. Hawkes, 183 N.C. 365, 111 S.E. 621
(1922) ; Ex parte Ratliff, 117 Tex. 325, 3 S.W.2d 406 (1928).
5. McAdams v. Smith, 25 Ill. App. 2d 237, 166 N.E2d 446, 449 (1960).
6. E.g., In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) ; Camarota v. United States, 111
F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 651 (1940) ; State v. Jackson,
147 Conn. 167, 158 A.2d 166 (1960) ; State v. Goff, 228 S.C. 17, 88 S.E.2d 788
(1955); State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 Pac. 793 (1928).
7. Noble v. Siwicki, 197 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1964); see also Gordon v. State, 73
Neb. 221, 102 N.W. 458 (1905).
& BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
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to deter misconduct in other cases.9 So while due process may
be sacrificed, "the power of courts to punish for contempts is a
necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary.
... Without authority to act promptly and independently the

courts could not administer public justice or enforce the rights
of private litigants.110
That summary punishment for a direct contempt must be used
with restraint is apparent from United States Supreme Court
decisions. The Court has held it to be a denial of due process
for a Michigan judge, acting as a one-man grand jury, to stop
his investigation and commit the witness to jail for contempt
without allowing the accused to be heard, in the absence of any
showing that the proceeding was necessary to prevent demoralization of the judge's authority.' But in Fisher v. Pace 2 the
Court upheld a contempt conviction of an attorney who, ignoring repeated judicial reprimands, conveyed information to the
jury which was not for its consideration. The Fisher case can
be distinguished from the former case on the theory that the
attorney committed such flagrant violations as to undermine the
court's authority.
Another outstanding case that reflects the position of the
Supreme Court is Oooke v. United States 3 in which an attorney
who had written a letter to the judge asking him to disqualify
himself from the case at bar was found guilty of contempt and
was punished summarily. In reversing the conviction the Court
stated:
Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court, requires that
the accused should be advised of the charges and have a
reasonable opportunity to meet them by 'way of defense or
explanation.1 4 (Emphasis added.)
Illinois is one of the few jurisdictions, if not the only one,
which has held that in special instances direct contempts, as
well as indirect contempts, are punishable only after a hearing
9. Summary Contempt: A Sword or a Shield?, 2 STAN. L. Rav. 764, 766
(1950).
10. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 501 (1911); see
also Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 205 (1874).
11. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
12. 336 U.S. 155 (1949), rehearing denied, 336 U.S. 928 (1949).
13. 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
14. Id. at 537.
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in which the accused is allowed to introduce evidence in his
defense. Illinois has justified its decisions for demanding evidence to convict on a direct contempt by distinguishing types
of direct contempt. The court has held that not all direct contempts are committed in the ocular view of the presiding judge
and that "misbehavior committed in any place set apart for the
use of any constituent part of the court is deemed to have been
committed in the presence of the court, and if contemptuous,
constitutes and is punishable as a direct contempt.""' In People
v. Spain0 the defendant was sentenced for contempt for refusal
to answer questions before the grand jury. The Supreme Court
of Illinois reversed the conviction on the ground that the defendant was denied the right to a full and impartial hearing. Again
in In re Estate of Kelly'7 the court reversed a contempt conviction on the ground of denial of due process when the defendant
had been convicted of contempt in the lower court for knowingly
presenting a false will for probate.
Consequently, the decision in the Sisar case is not surprising
considering the precedent set by the Illinois Supreme Court.
In reaching the decision in the case, the court relied heavily on
the United States Supreme Court decision of In re Oliver,', in
which the defendant was not advised of the charge, was not
given time to prepare his defense, and was not allowed to crossexamine grand jury witnesses or to summon witnesses in his
own defense. Clearly, the Court reasoned, the defendant was
denied due process since he was not given the opportunity to
defend himself.
The dissent in the Skar case points out, however, that the
defendant was given an opportunity to be "heard" by answering
the petition, and when he did not, the trial court properly interpreted this as a waiver of his right to put in issue the allegations
of the petition. The dissenting judge reinforced his opinion by
quoting from the court's syllabus in Nebraska Children's Home
Soc'y v. State:
Where a contempt proceeding is instituted by information
and rule to show cause, it is the duty of the defendant to
15. People v. Hagopian, 408 Ill.618, 97 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1951); see also
In re Estate of Kelly, 365 Ill.
174, 6 N.E.2d 113 (1936).

16. 307 Ill.
283, 138 N.E. 614 (1923).
17. 365 I1. 174, 6 N.E.2d 113 (1936).

18. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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file an answer if he desires to traverse the facts charged.
Failing, on sufficient opportunity to so do, the court may
19
treat the facts alleged in the information as confessed.
Although the dissent presents a strong argument, the weight of
authority holds that in a criminal contempt proceeding the
and the burden is on the prosedefendant is presumed innocent
20
cution to prove the charges.
There are no cases dealing directly with this point in South
Carolina, but dicta suggest that given facts similar to those in
the Sitar case, the court would hold that there had been a viola2
tion of due process. In Hennesaw Mills Co. v. Walker 1 the
court held that it was error to incorporate a direction for
imprisonment in an order for the delivery of money by the
judgment debtor to the receiver. The court stated: "As we
understand it, the practice in this State is not to attach until the
2 2 In State v. Hunt28
party has had opportunity to be heard.
which involved the attachment of an attorney for contempt
without hearing the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated
that the right to a hearing "has the sanction of a well settled
time and an oppractice, and is prudent, as affording cooling
24
portunity for the interference of friends."
Hopefully Illinois' recent decision in the Skar case will be
carefully scrutinized by other jurisdictions with the result that
they, too, will realize that not all direct contempts of court can
be punished summarily without violating fundamental rights
of individuals granted under the Constitution. If other courts,
like Illinois, will distinguish the types of direct contemptsthose committed in the ocular view of the judge and those committed in a constituent part of the court-and punish summarily
only those committed in the actual view of the court, the requirements for due process will clearly be fulfilled.
NAwoY CATHmnTE

McCoy

19. 47 Neb. 765, 78 N.W. 267, 268 (Syl. 10) (1899); see also Zobel v.
People ex rel. Kyle, 49 Colo. 142, 111 Pac. 846 (1910) and State ex rel.
Wright v. Hinkle, 137 Neb. 735, 291 N.W. 68 (1940).
20. E.g., United States v. Balaban, 26 F.Supp. 491 (N.D. Ill. 1939) ; Gordon
v. State, 73 Neb. 221, 102 N.W. 458 (1905); In re Nunns, 176 N.Y.S. 858
(App. Div. 1919); State v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 187 N.W. 830 (1922).
21.
22.
23.
24.

19 S.C. 104 (1882).
Id. at 113.
4 Strob. 322 (S.C. 1850).
Id. at 339.
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LEX FORI VS. LEX LOCI IN THE FIELD OF TORTS*
In the law of conflicts there exists an unequivocal and strictly
applied rule that in order to maintain a tort action, there must
be a good cause of action in existence under the laws of the place
where the alleged tort occurred.'
In wrongful death actions, the established rule has been that
the lex loci delicti determines whether or not there is a right to
sue, 2 and, if so, who is entitled to the damages, 3 and the amount
of such damages.Mr. Justice Holmes, in expressing the opinion of the Court
in Slater v. Mexicam National R. R., established the "vested
rights" theory by saying:
But as the only source of the obligation is the law of the
place of the act, it follows that that law determines not
merely the existence of the obligation, but equally determines its extent.5
While the majority of courts have found Mr. Justice Holmes'
theory of "vested rights" to be to their liking, others find that
it is distasteful in certain circumstances and attempt to avoid
the rule of lew loci delicti by rather specious reasoning to justify
their decision in applying the law of the forum.6 Some courts
have found a means of escape through the corridors of contract
law, 7 while more frequently others evade the rule of lew loci
delicti, by applying the law of the forum as a matter of pro* Oshiek v. Oshiek (S.C. 1964).
op LAW § 110 at 207 (1959); RESTATEmENT: CoN§ 379 (1934). For definition of the place of the wrong as being
in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
1. LEFLAR, CoNxFLTcs

FLIcT OF LAWS

alleged tort takes place see Restatement. Id. § 377.

2. LFxILA, op. cit. supra note 1 at § 114; RESTATE ENT, op. ci. .sumra note 1,
§ 391.
3. Pennsylvania Ry. v. Levine, 263 Fed. 557 (2d Cir. 1920); Free v. Southera Ry., 78 S.C. 57, 58 S.E. 952 (1907); Restatement, op. cit. .upra note 1,
at 393.
4. Northern Pacific R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); Lauria v. E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 241 Fed. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1917); LEFLAR, op. cit.
mupra note 1, at §§ 391 (d), 412.
5. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904); accord, Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 223 U.S. 354 (1914); Davis v. Mills, 194
U.S. 451 (1904).
6. See Childress, Toward the Proper Law of the Tort, 40 TEXAS L. REV.
336, (1962); Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori in Conflict of Laws, Exception or
Rule?, 32 RocKY MT. L. REv. 13 (1960).
7. Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333. 143 AtI. 163
(1928) ; cf. Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 138 A.2d 705 (1958).
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cedure rather than substance8 as a means to achieve the "ends"
of justice.
The justification for the rule of lex looi delicti most often
relied on by the courts is article IV, section 1, of the United
States Constitution which provides:
Full Faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other
state. And the congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall
be proved, and the effect thereof.
Thus, it becomes important to determine whether the application of the law of the forum is in violation of the Constitution
of the United States.
The conflict of laws problem among the several states and in
international matters was recognized at a very early time in the
United States. This is evidenced by the fact that even the ill
fated Articles of Confederation had a rudimentary full faith
and credit clauseY Today, the very purpose of the full faith and
credit clause is to alter the independence of the several states
and prevent them from ignoring the obligations created by the
laws and judicial proceedings of the other states, and to create
a crucible making each state an integral part of a single nation,
through which certain rights and obligations would be recognized regardless of origin.10
While the full faith and credit clause does not compel a state
to adopt any particular set of rules as to conflict of laws, it does
set forth certain requirements which each state must observe
when asked to do so by a sister state, 1 leaving the states free
to adopt rules of conflict of laws as they choose. 12
When the policy of one state statute comes into conflict with
that of another, the necessity of some accommodation of the
8. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R. 2d 1162 (1953).
9. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6

VAND.

L. REv. 581

(1953), reprinted in Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, Selected Readings on Conflict
of Laws 255 (1956) ; see generally Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and
Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL L. REv. 1 (1944).
10. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935)
(holding full faith and credit to judgments includes judgment for taxes).
11. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953).
12. Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916).
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conflicting interest of the two states becomes imperative.' This
conflict can no longer be described as that between the policies
of two states, 14 because today it has come to mean the conflict
between the policy of one state and "the strong unifying principle embodied in the full faith and credit clause looking toward
maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations on rights
5
created or recognized by the statutes of sister states."'l
Resolution of such conflicts by permissive weighing and balancing of the conflicting clauses and interests of both the foreign
and the domiciliary state, has been approved in decisions by
the Supreme Court.' 6
This method of weighing and balancing the interest has provided the basis for decisions in the field of workman's compensationY1 Although it must be conceded that due to the fact that
these compensation acts were enacted with special social and
economic purposes in mind, greater freedom has been permitted
in the process of extending the scope of local laws to those who,
according to local theories, come within its prospective coverage.' It has also been used in insurance actions, 19 wrongful
death actions, 20 and more recently in one case arising under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, in which the court held:

Where more than one state has sufficient contact with the
activity in question, the forum state, by analysis of the
interest possessed by the states involved, could constitu13. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 159-60 (1944),

citing Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Commn, 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935) ; see generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. CHI. L.REv. 9 (1958)
(that the major uncertainty in the field of full faith and credit involves the

extra-territorial effect that must be given to the statutes of sister states);

Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes, the Defense of Public Policy, 19
U. CHi. L. REV. 339 (1952).
14. Alaska Packers Ass'n v.Industrial Acc. Comn'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
15. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951).
16. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953) ; Hughes v. Fetter,
id.; Stumberg, The Place of the Wrong: Torts and Conflict of Laws, 34
WASH. L. REv. 388 (1959).
17. Carrol v.Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); compare Bradford Elec. Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
18. Stumberg, supra note 16.
19. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Co., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1944).
20. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.. 345 U.S. 514 (1953); First Nat'l Bank
v. United Airlines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951).
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tionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or
another state having such an interest in the multistate
activity.21 [Emphasis added].
Thus it can easily be seen that the mood of the courts today
is to deviate from the narrow path of strict application of the
full faith and credit clause to a more liberal and well justified
position, and in each instance to delve into the merits of the
particular case.
In 1962 the highest court in New York 22 laid the foundation
for what may be termed a new era in the field of torts in conflict
of laws. That case involved an action for wrongful death as a
result of a plane which crashed in Massachusetts after taking off
in New York. The New York Court of Appeals in applying the
rule of lex fori and abandoning lex loci delicti, stated by way of
dictum that the $15,000 limitation on damages under the Massachusetts wrongful death act might not be applied in the state of
New York. The court in justifying its departure from lex loci
delicti stated that "modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject traveling citizens of this state to the laws of other
23
states, over and through which they move."1

Thus, in balancing the interest of the state of New York with
those of the strong unifying principle embodied in the full faith
and credit clause, the court decided in favor of the public policy
of New York in regard to amount of damages for torts committed against the citizens of that state.
24
In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., a second federal case
brought in the southern district of New York as a result of the
same plane crash in Massachusetts, Judge McGohey refused to
apply the Massachusetts $15,000 limitation on damages and
in so doing ruled that he was obliged to apply a dictum of the
25
New York court in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. On ap21. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962). This action arose out

of an airplane which crashed in Missouri while enroute from Oklahoma to New

York. The Court held that under the Federal Tort Claims Act the conflict of
law rules of the state where the negligence occurred were applicable; thus Oklahoma's law, applying the Missouri Wrongful Death Statute governed, and the

representatives were entitled to no further recovery. ($15,000 had already
been recovered or at least tendered in Missouri.)
22. 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961). This case arose out of the
same ill-fated flight as did Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553
(2d Cir. 1962).
23. Id. at 135, 172 N.E.2d at 527.
24. 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

25. 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
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peal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one judge
dissenting, held that the trial court's refusal to apply the
$15,000 limitation under the Massachusetts statute was a violation of the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution. 26 The majority, in reaching their decision, relied
heavily on Hughes v. Fetter27 and FirstNational Bank v. United
Airlines.2 8 Both of these cases involved wrongful death actions
and were dismissed by the respective state courts due to the
forum's statutory policy against entertaining foreign wrongful
death actions. The United States Supreme Court reversed both
of these cases as violating the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution after finding that such wrongful death actions were
not against the policy and interest of the states due to the fact
that they both entertained such actions arising in their own
states.
The panel court, in viewing these cases along with Pearson,
found that New York, likewise, had no antagonism to wrongful
death actions in general, but only to the limitation of liability.2 9
On rehearing en banc, the court of appeals, in affirming the
district court, held that the New York court was not required
to apply the $15,000 limitation under the Massachusetts statute.3 0
The court, relying on a United States Supreme Court case,8 '
and two state supreme court cases,8 2 adopted the view that a
state having substantial ties with the transaction in dispute has
a legitimate constitutional interest in the application of its own
rule of law,38 and further that a court could examine each issue,
in the litigation weighing the contacts of the various states involved, and shape its rules controlling the litigation without
interfering with the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.

4

26. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
27. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).

28. 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
29. See 307 F.2d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1962). In Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953), the Court, however, said that the crucial factor in
Hudges and First National Bank was that the forum laid an uneven hand on
causes of action arising within and without the forum state, resulting in
discrimination against such foreign causes of action.

30. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962) (6-3

decision).

31. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).

32. Haumschild v. Continental Co., 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 X.W.2d 814 (1959);
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R. 2d 1162 (1953).
33. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553, 563 (2d Cir. 1962).

34. Id. at 561.
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The theory of weighing and balancing the states' interest, originally confined to the field of conflict of laws has been extended
to tort damages, or more specifically, the statutory limits on
such damages.
The question arises as to whether the theory of balancing the
interest and policies of the states should be limited only to damages in a tort action when it is more urgently needed in determining whether a right of action exists in the area of personal
injuries.
In restating the general rule of conflicts of law in tort actions,
in order for such an action to be maintainable, there must be a
good cause of action existent under the laws of the place where
the alleged tort occurred.3 5
In the 1961 case of Oshiek v. Oshiek,3 6 the South Carolina
Supreme Court, in this case of novel impression had an opportunity to follow the modern trend of weighing and balancing
the interest of the states in deciding issues in conflict of laws.
In Osliek the wife brought suit against the husband in the
common pleas court, Beaufort County, for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred in the state of
Georgia. The injuries were alleged to have been sustained as a
result of the negligent, willful, wanton, careless and reckless
operation of an automobile owned and driven by the respondent
at the time of the injury.
The trial court sustained the husband's demurrer to the complaint on the grounds of Zem loci delicti saying that Georgia fol-7
lows the common law in regard to interspousal civil actions ;3
and since no right of action exists under the law of that state,
the wife has no cause of action which can be enforced in South
Carolina.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in affirming the trial
court's decision, refused to apply the balancing of interest and
policies of the states. In so doing, the court placed much
emphasis on the North Carolina case of Howard v. Howard,33
whose facts were identical to those before the court and in which
the court applied the rule of leoj loci delicti, and on Shaw v. Lee,
another case of that state, in which the court had said:
35. See LEFLARi,supra note 1.
36. Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964).
37. Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937); Wright v.
Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952).
38. 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

South CarolinaCOMMNTS
Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6

1965]

The reasoning supporting the conclusions reached in Howard
v. Howard . . . is, we think, sound. To depart from the
principles on which those cases were based will open the
door to a multitude of claims founded on the assention that
the law of lex domicilii is more equitable and just than the
lex loci-justifying the application of substantive law instead of the lex loci. We do not deem it wise to voyage into
such uncharted sea, leaving behind well established conflict
3
of laws rules.

9

In Oshiek the appellant relied on Haumschild v. ContinentaZ
Co., 40 which held that the law of the domicile is applicable in
interspousal suits. This case, along with a United States Supreme
Court case4 ' and another state supreme court case,42 were relied
on in the en banc session of the New York court of appeals in
Pearson to support its view that a state having substantial ties
with the transaction in dispute has a legitimate constitutional
interest in the application of its own rule of law,4 3 and further

that a court could examine each issue in the case weighing the
contacts of the various states involved, and shape its rules controlling the litigation without interfering with the Constitution.
To be sure, one basic task of conflict of laws is to provide
methods of choice which will facilitate the fair and sensible accommodation of conflicting state policies.44 It is readily apparent
that any such mechanical jurisprudence is particularly unsuited
in the field of tort rights of action in that it fails to accord
recognition to the true interests of the parties as well as the
states.

45

The court in Oshieo cited Coster v. Coster,40 in which the New
York court dismissed a wife's complaint against her husband
and said that her "right to bring and to maintain the suit and
to recover damages against her spouse is a substantive right, a
39. 258 N.C. 609, 616, 129 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1963). This case involved action
by wife against the estate of her husband for injuries allegedly received as the
result of the negligence of her husband while driving in Virginia which is a
common law jurisdiction.
40. 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
41. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).

42. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162
(1953).
43. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
44. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L. REv. 822 (1950).
45. Shuman & Prevezer, Torts, In English and American Conflict of Laws:
The Role of the Formn, 58 Micr. L. REV. 1067, 1071-1073 (1958).
46. 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509, 146 A.L.R. 702 (1943).
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part of her cause of action and not a mere matter of remedy,"
and added that substantive rights are to be determined by the
lew loci delicti unless they contravene the public policy of the
forum.
Thus, it would seem that the exception to the rule of lex loci
deliciti applies where there is a controvention of the public policy of the forum.
There can be no doubt that the denial of a right of action in
interspousal litigation is a controvention of strong public policy
against such denial as expressed in the South Carolina Code.47
Had the South Carolina Supreme Court chose to follow Pearson, Haunschild and the modern trend of balancing the interest
and policies of the states, there could be no denial that the
interest of South Carolina greatly overpowers any interest the
state of Georgia may have in Oshie. On the one hand, there
is South Carolina's strong public policy of allowing interspousal
civil cases as expressed by its statute; while on the other hand
there is little or no interest by the state of Georgia in denying
such actions. The reasons for the common law rule denying civil
actions between husband and wife are largely extinct today. At
common law, the husband and wife were considered a unity;
the personal property of the wife became that of the husband
and any recovery by her would belong to him, so in essence, the
results would be the same if the husband had sued himself. Such
unity has long since been destroyed in all the states by the enactment of emancipation statutes and statutes regarding the property rights of married women. Another reason for the common
law rule is that the personal immunity which protects the husband is based simply on the public policy of preserving domestic
peace and tranquility. 4 In Wright v. Wright, a Georgia case
cited in Oshiek, the court held:
We therefore hold that there is not, in this State, any right
of action in one spouse against another for a personal tort
not involving any property right, and that this is true regardless of the fact that the tort is wantonly and maliciously
49
inflicted.
Thus, according to the holding of this case, it must be assumed
that while no cause of action for a broken arm or an injury to
47. S.C. Code Ann. § 10-216 (1962).
48. Kaczorowski v. Kaczorowski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663, 104 A.L.R. 1267

(1936).

49. 85 Ga. App. 721, 724, 70 S.E.2d 152, 154 (1952).
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the person exists, a spouse would, however, have a right of action
in that state for damages done to her hat or dress which resulted
from the acts of the husband. Further, it may be observed, in
cases involving willful and malicious torts, that where the marriage has reached the stage where the wife wishes to sue the husband for willful harm there is little domestic tranquility left to
be disturbed. Also, recognition must be given to the fact that
there is no danger of disturbing domestic tranquility in a civil
action for personal injuries suffered by the spouse, where, as
in most cases, the husband carries indemnity insurance.
As a result of the application of the "analysis of the interest"
test, it can be seen that while the state of Georgia may allegedly
have an interest in protecting the domestic tranquility of its
inhabitants, it has no interest in the outcome of Oshiek -whatsoever.
A more practical analysis of the interest of this state would
reveal that a blind adherence to the rule of lex loci delicti, in
cases such as Oshiek could result in an increased welfare state.
To illustrate, while the foreign common law jurisdiction provided
the setting of the accident, the domicile must suffer the possible
long lasting outcome in that the taxpayers of this state would be
left the burden of "footing the bill" should the spouse have been
permanently injured and should her other means of support
cease. Oshie, did not lead to such results, but are we to assume
the decision would have been different if it had?
Conceded, the rule of lex loi delicti may have been appropriate in less modern times, but with the passing of time and the
changing of conditions, the need for a re-evaluation in the field
of conflict of laws has become self-evident. The present theory,
in light of these changed conditions, presents fully its obsolescence if mechanically applied to a situation as in Oshiek.
Rather than resorting to specious reasoning of the decision,
as some courts have felt compelled to do, or even worse, to
mechanically apply the rule of leo loi delicti, a more just result
may have been attained, had the court chosen to give frank
recognition to the social, economic and other governmental interests which necessitated the application of South Carolina law.
In regard to application of analysis of the interests among the
states, it has been argued that such should be dealt with by the
legislature and not by the judiciary. 50 The basis of such an arguS0. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171 (1959); Kramer, Interest and Policy Clashes in Conflict of
Laws, 13 RuTGas L Rav. 523 (1959).
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ment is founded on the premise that the courts are limited in that
their primary source of information must be supplied by opposing council, while the legislature's source of information is unlimited and thus the legislature is in a better position to determine
which of the conflicting interests is paramount. At first glance
such an argument seems well founded, but further consideration
reveals that such an undertaking would necessitate a long range
investigation by the legislature; and in addition, the problem of
a strict and rigid rule, unsuitable to conditions in later years
might well be presented. From the more practical viewpoint, the
analysis of the interest would more appropriately be left in the
hands of the courts.
Another objection to applying the law of the forum might be
that to do so would violate the due process clause of the United
States Constitution, but such an objection, while at one time
very sound,5 ' no longer occupies such an esteemed position. The
prevailing rule has come to be that when the forum state has such
a substantial contact with the action as to constitute a legitimate
interest, it may apply its own law without violating the due
process clause of he fourteenth amendment,5 2 even assuming the
other state may also have a similar interest.53
To make the right of action in interspousal suits depend on
the lem Zoci is not only contrary to the interest of this state, but
it denies a citizen, for whose benefit the legislature enacted a
statute, the right of a remedy for a wrong done to her and
thereby denies her the rights of an emancipated individual.
The legislature has deemed such emancipation necessary and
within the public policy and best interest of the people of this
state.
This case stresses the need for a re-evaluation of the rule of
leaw looi delicti in the several states, the use of which sometimes
results in the sacrifice of individual rights, and interest of the
state, in return for the benefits derived from uniformity.
THomAS B. BA im &u

51. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918) (5-4 decision).
52. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). The
Court held that since Louisiana had a ligitimate interest in safeguarding the
rights of her citizens she could apply her own law without violation of due
process. Accord, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1944).
53. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 550.
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